Four normally developing 2-year-old children were exposed to a story in which six novel characters appeared and were named. To assess learning of the character name -> picture relations, all six pictures were presented together as comparisons in matching-tosample test trials and the children were asked to make selections as each of the six names were dictated as samples. No child learned any of the target relations, but 2 made unreinforced conditional selections (URCSs) to some of the sample names (i.e., made their own one-to-one assignments of sample names to comparison pictures). This was the first time URCS had been demonstrated on an auditory-visual matching task, on any matching task with more than three comparisons, and with children so young. The long-term retention of a specific pattern of URCS was also shown for the first time, with 1 child maintaining his sample-comparison assignments across a 43-day gap in testing. The findings highlight the potential threat of URCS-based false-positives on tests of young children's emergent matching-to-sample (e.g., in tests of stimulus equivalence or ostensive learning).
Four normally developing 2-year-old children were exposed to a story in which six novel characters appeared and were named. To assess learning of the character name -> picture relations, all six pictures were presented together as comparisons in matching-tosample test trials and the children were asked to make selections as each of the six names were dictated as samples. No child learned any of the target relations, but 2 made unreinforced conditional selections (URCSs) to some of the sample names (i.e., made their own one-to-one assignments of sample names to comparison pictures). This was the first time URCS had been demonstrated on an auditory-visual matching task, on any matching task with more than three comparisons, and with children so young. The long-term retention of a specific pattern of URCS was also shown for the first time, with 1 child maintaining his sample-comparison assignments across a 43-day gap in testing. The findings highlight the potential threat of URCS-based false-positives on tests of young children's emergent matching-to-sample (e.g., in tests of stimulus equivalence or ostensive learning).
In studies of stimulus equivalence, arbitrary (or symbolic) matching-tosample (MTS) procedures are used to teach subjects stimulus relations and then to assess the nature of those taught relations. On each MTS trial, a subject is presented with a sample stimulus and an array of two or more visual comparison stimuli, and is required to select the comparison that corresponds to the sample. First, a subject might be taught that when stimulus A1 is the sample, selecting comparison B1 over B2 is correct (i.e. , produces reinforcers), and that when A2 is the sample, selecting B2 over B1 is correct. After learning the A 1-B1 and A2-B2 conditional. relations that comprise the AB task, the subject might be taught BC (conditional relations B1-C1 and B2-C2). Tests can then be given to determine whether the AB and BC conditional relations are also equivalence relations. Equivalence relations are defined mathematically as the only relations that have all three
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Although separate tests of each property can be given, Sidman (1994) proposed that one single test can assess all three properties at once; in the example above, in which AB and BC are trained, the appropriate single test of equivalence would be a CA test.
Passing this CA test, (i.e., given C1 as a sample, selecting comparison A 1 and not A2; and given C2, selecting A2 and not A 1) without requiring differential reinforcement for correct responding, suggests that the training had established equivalence relations between corresponding A, B, and C stimuli (if A = Band B = C, then C = A). The emergent performances (unreinforced matching of C1 to A 1 and C2 to A2) would be consistent with the formation of two stimulus classes, each comprising three physically different members related via equivalence (e.g., Class 1: A 1 = B1 = C1; Class 2: A2 = B2 = C2). However, an alternative explanation of the emergent CA performance is possible. In some studies, subjects who have been taught a series of conditional relations via arbitrary two-choice MTS have gone on to show consistent conditional selections on unreinforced matching trials with stimuli different from those used in training (Saunders, K. J., & Spradlin, 1990; Saunders, R. R., Saunders, Kirby, & Spradlin, 1988) . In these cases, the training seemed to have engendered 'generalized conditional responding,' a pattern of consistently selecting one comparison stimulus in the presence of one of the samples and the other comparison stimulus in the presence of the other sample. The subjects had learned from the training to match samples and comparisons on a one-to-one basis, and thus continued to do so when subsequently presented with completely novel stimuli, despite having no feedback to indicate which sample went with which comparison. It is this ability to make 'unreinforced conditional selections' that could enable subjects to fortuitously pass an equivalence test like CA in our example even if no equivalence classes had formed. Given that there are two samples and comparisons, there is a 50:50 chance of relating them 'correctly' (i.e., C1 with A 1, and C2 with A2) through unreinforced conditional selection. If that happens, then the emergence of CA has nothing specifically to do with the AB and BC training. It is equally likely for the CA conditional discriminations to have emerged after training on tasks that could not possibly have produced them via equivalence (e.g., AB and CD, or even EF and GH). Unreinforced conditional selection (URCS) can therefore bring about 'falsepositives' on equivalence tests.
Relatively little is known of the factors that may affect the making of URCSs. One possible factor is the subject's age. The consensus of opinion among those who have studied URCS is that it is a generalized performance that arises from a history of reinforced conditional responding. Several theoretical accounts formulated within an operant framework attempt to explain the origin of such generalized performances (see Boelens, 1994; Catania, 1996; Hayes & Hayes, 1992) . Although these various accounts use different terms to refer to the generalized performances (for example, Hayes & Hayes call them 'relational frames,' whereas Catania calls them 'higher-order response classes'), they share a common supposition. That is, the reinforcement history responsible for the generalized performance occurs preexperimentally, in the natural environment of humans from infancy onwards. Thus far the generalized performance of URCS has been shown by normal adults and children aged 4 to 12 years (Harrison & Green, 1990; Saunders, Drake, & Spradlin, 1999; Williams, Saunders, Saunders, & Spradlin, 1995) , and by mildly mentally retarded adolescents and adults (Saunders, K. J., & Spradlin, 1990; Saunders, R. R., et aI., 1988) . Could children much younger than 4 years of age make URCSs? At what age has a child experienced enough of a reinforced history of conditional responding for URCS to be established in its repertoire?
Task type may also be a relevant factor. The samples and comparisons in all previous studies of URCS were abstract figures, and thus URCS has only ever been shown on visual-visual matching tasks. Could URCSs also be made on auditory-visual matching tasks?
These questions are relevant not just to those studying stimulus equivalence but also to child language researchers who routinely use auditory-visual MTS to test preschool children's comprehension of novel words introduced in experimental settings. For example, in an ostensive procedure, a single novel object is repeatedly shown to a child and named by the experimenter. In subsequent unreinforced tests, if the child consistently selects that object (rather than other unnamed novel items) upon hearing its name as a sample, it is assumed that the ostensive exposures are responsible for the outcome (Baldwin, 1993; Dollaghan , 1985; Dunham, Dunham, & Curwin , 1993; Oviatt, 1980 Oviatt, , 1982 Woodward , Markman, & Fitzsimmons, 1994) . The assumption may be called into question if it can be shown that preschool children can make URCSs on auditory-visual tests and thus have the potential to produce 'falsepositives' on vocabulary tests.
Other questions remain. Thus far, URCS has been shown on twochoice and three-choice matching tasks (only the Williams et aI. , 1995, study used three-comparison displays). Could subjects make URCSs when faced with a larger number of comparisons on each trial? Finally, all previous studies of URCS have done something within the experiment to support the emergence of generalized conditional responding. Could URCS occur in the absence of an experimental history to support it, as predicted by the operant accounts of generalized performance referred to previously? In all experiments except those of Harrison and Green (1990) , the subjects were initially trained on several reinforced arbitrary matching tasks, and this prior training may have been necessary for their subsequent demonstration of URCS with novel stimuli. Although most of Harrison and Green's subjects responded conditionally on unreinforced trials without an experimental history of reinforced conditional responding, support of a different kind for URCS was nevertheless given within their experiments. This support came in the form of a nonstandard matching format that enabled the subjects to assign samples to 'correct' comparisons even though comparison choices produced no differential consequences. The subjects were able to make these assignments on the basis that samples and their correct comparisons always appeared together from trial to trial, whereas the 'incorrect' comparisons always varied. Across trials, the correct comparison for a given sample was signaled by the fact that it was the only one to consistently appear with that sample. On standard matching trials, correct and incorrect comparisons are the same on each trial with a given sample, and so there is no such basis for making unreinforced sample-comparison assignments. We therefore do not know whether Harrison and Green's subjects, who on their first set of matching tasks required from 3 to 41 16-trial sessions before consistently selecting correct comparisons, would have from the outset made URCSs based on their own arbitrary assignments had they been presented with a standard matching-tosample format.
The present study assessed whether preschool children with no experimental history of reinforced arbitrary MTS could show URCS on a 6-choice auditory-visual matching task presented in a standard format. The study did not set out to make such an assessment; rather, it began as an investigation of young children's ability to derive novel name -. picture (auditory-visual) relations from mere exposure to those stimuli in a familiar context. Four 2-year-old children were exposed to pairings of six auditory names and corresponding pictures of the characters in a story. The pairings were produced in one of two ways: (1) by an experimenter pointing to pictures of the characters in an illustrated book and naming them as she read the story out loud to 2 of the children, and (2) by the other 2 children watching an animated video of the same story in which the characters spoke and called each other by their names. To assess learning of the target relations, performances on unreinforced name -. picture matching trials were tested both before and after exposure sessions. In these tests, all six character pictures were presented together as comparisons on each trial, and the child was asked to select one as the experimenter dictated each of the six character names as samples. There was no evidence that any child learned any of the target relations, but two of them showed signs of URCS and thus it is their data on the pretests and posttests that we focus on below. In addition, a followup with 1 of these children is reported because it chronicled the long-term stability of his URCSs.
General Method

Subjects
Four normally developing children took part. They were aged 25-26 months at the start of the study. They all attended a daycare nursery run by the School of Psychology at Bangor. One child, HW, was male, and the others were female. All were experimentally naive. They were initially selected for their willingness to interact with the experimenters during several play sessions held in the main nursery playroom. Table 1 shows their chronological and language-equivalent ages (as determined by the Reynell Developmental Language Scales; see Reynell, 1977 
V
All sessions took place in a small research room on the nursery premises. Video cameras in the room recorded the children's on-task behavior. The room also contained child-size chairs and a table on which comparison stimuli were presented during matching-to-sample trials. The comparisons were colored pictures, each on a laminated white card measuring 13 cm by 10 cm. Two sets of comparisons were used. One set of six comparisons comprised pictures of a cat, dog, fish, rabbit, cow, and horse. According to parents and nursery nurses the subjects could reliably select these pictures upon hearing their names (i.e., these were 'familiar' stimuli) . The second set comprised pictures of six characters from a modernized version of the Noddy series of children's stories, originally written by Enid Blyton. Parents and nursery nurses confirmed that the children had not encountered these stories prior to the studies and that the characters were therefore novel to them. The six characters were Bumpy (a dog), Tubby (a bear), Tessie (a bear), Bert (a monkey) , Dinah (a doll), and Mr Sparks (an automobile mechanic). These particular characters were chosen because they each looked distinctly different and they all appeared together in the same story. The story, "Noddy and the Milkman," was chosen because it was available in book and video formats as required for the exposure phase of the study. A portable television and video player was used during video exposure sessions. On matching-tosample trials the comparisons were presented on a wooden display board comprising two leaves, 60 cm long by 30 cm wide, joined together to form the folding covers of a 'book' by a hinge attached along the long edges.
Procedure
Sessions (no more than three per day) were conducted 3 to 5 days per week, and lasted 15 to 30 minutes each. In exposure sessions the children were exposed to several contiguous pairings of each novel character and its name either by viewing the video or by having the book read to them by an experimenter (further details are not given here because they are irrelevant to this report; LS and HW were exposed to the book, and EL and CG observed the video). On matching-to-sample (MTS) test sessions, each child was asked to select picture comparisons conditional upon auditory word samples spoken by the first experimenter (E1). The child and E1 sat at opposite sides of the table, facing each other. A second experimenter (E2) sat on the floor behind the child. E2 began the proceedings by placing the comparisons onto the presentation board without the child or E1 seeing. The comparisons were mounted on the inside face of the top leaf of the presentation board. Three comparisons were spaced evenly apart and in line with the top edge of the leaf, and three were similarly aligned against the bottom edge. Having mounted the comparisons in their predetermined positions (as listed on a printed sheet), E2 closed the board and handed it, with the pictures hidden inside, to E1. E1 then placed the closed board on the table to face the child , and raised the top leaf until it was fully vertical. At this point the comparisons were vertically in front of the child at his/her eye level and within easy reach. E1 could not see any comparisons (they were on the opposite side of the leaf that faced her), and E2 remained seated behind the child, so neither experimenter could cue the child's subsequent choice of comparison. When E1 was satisfied the child was ready, she asked "Where is X?", where X was the sample name indicated on her printed sheet listing the order of sample presentations for that session. When the child had selected a comparison by pointing to or touching it, E2 signaled nonverbally to E1 to begin the next trial. There was no other consequence for completing a trial (i.e. , no differential reinforcement). The board remained open for six trials, and on each trial E1 dictated a different sample name. The board was then returned to E2 to rearrange the comparisons for the next six trials. There were therefore 12 trials per 6-choice session, with each of six sample names presented twice. Across the series of sessions, each novel picture appeared as the correct comparison once in each of the six positions on the board .
Scoring procedure. Two independent observers viewed the videotapes of all test sessions and noted which comparison was selected on each trial. Trials on which a child did not point distinctly to a comparison were scored as 'none' selected. There was 100% agreement in the scoring of the two observers.
Main Study
Method
The experimental phases are listed chronologically in Table 2 and are described below.
Tests of familiar name-picture relations. Each child's auditory-visual (name-picture) matching of the six familiar animal stimuli was assessed in two 12-trial test sessions, giving a total of 4 trials per sample name.
Preexposure Tests 1-3 of novel name-picture relations. The children 's auditory-visual (name-picture) matching of the six novel characters was assessed in three 12-trial test sessions, giving a total of 36 trials, 6 per sample name. Postexposure Tests 1-3 of novel name-picture relations. The children each had three exposure sessions, one per day. LS and HW were exposed to the book, and CG and EL to the video. Each exposure session was followed immediately by a novel name-picture test session, giving a total in this phase of three 12-trial test sessions, 36 trials in total with 6 per sample name.
Results
On tests of familiar name-picture relations, EL, HW, LS, and CG were correct on 24, 23, 23, and 21 trials out of 24 respectively, thus showing they had the prerequisite skills to perform successfully on 6-choice matching tasks (e.g., listening to sample words, scanning the array of comparisons, withholding responses until the correct comparison was found). On preexposure tests of novel name-picture matching, EL, HW, LS, and CG made 5, 4, 3, and 6 correct selections respectively, and on the critical postexposure tests they made 3, 0, 7, and 9 respectively. Each test had 36 trials so, given six choices, around six correct would be expected by chance alone; there was therefore no evidence that any subject had learned the target relations following the exposures. Although their responding was at chance levels the children were not in all cases making random comparison selections; EL and HW selected some comparisons conditional upon specific samples. The criterion for these URCSs was set as follows. First, the child had to select the same comparison on at least five of six trials with a specific sample per test phase, and not select that comparison to the same degree given any other sample. Then, in order to confirm that selection of the comparison was truly conditional upon one specific sample, and not the result of a more general or unconditional preference, selections of the same comparison on trials that did not include that specific sample had to be at or below chance levels (i.e., five or fewer selections over the 30 remaining trials in a test phase). Instances of URCS that met this criterion are depicted in bold print in Table 3 . In the preexposure test phase, HW consistently selected the picture of Bumpy conditional upon the "Mr Sparks" sample name, and Dinah conditional upon ''Tubby.'' He also showed a tendency to select Tubby given ''Tessie'' and Bert given "Bumpy" that narrowly missed the criterion for URCS (in each case the comparison was selected on four of six trials with the sample, rather than five of six as required for the criterion to be met). In his postexposure phase that began 5 days later, HW maintained criterion levels of relating "Sparks" to Bumpy and ''Tubby'' to Dinah, reached criterion in relating ''Tessie'' to Tubby, and again narrowly missed criterion for relating "Bumpy" to Bert. In her preexposure test, EL met criterion in relating "Bert" to Mr Sparks and narrowly missed criterion in relating "Mr Sparks" to Tubby (selecting the latter on four of six trials with that sample) and ''Tessie'' to Dinah (although she selected Dinah given ''Tessie'' on five of six trials, she also selected Dinah in six of the thirty remaining trials; criterion demanded no more than five such selections). In her postexposure test, EL maintained criterion in relating "Bert" to Mr Sparks, reached criterion in relating ''Tessie'' to Dinah, and again narrowly missed criterion in relating "Mr Sparks" to Tubby. Table 3 Number 
Follow-Up Study
Method and Results
Only HW was available for the follow-up study that assessed longterm retention of URCSs.
Postexposure Test 4 of novel name-picture relations. Forty-three days after his last session (Postexposure Test 3 of the main study), HW's auditory-visual (name-picture) matching of the six novel characters was reassessed in one 12-trial test session (Postexposure Test 4, 2 trials per sample name). Despite the lengthy interval since his last test, HW continued to respond according to the relations he had previously formed to criterion. He matched "Tubby" to Dinah, "Sparks" to Bumpy, and "Tessie" to Tubby on each trial with those samples (and never selected those comparisons given any other sample name). In addition, both times he was asked to select "Dinah" he chose Sparks, and both times he was asked to select "Bert" he chose Bert. When given the "Bumpy" sample name, he selected Tessie on one trial and Sparks on the other.
Discussion
This study generated several original findings. It went beyond previous studies in demonstrating (a) that children younger than before (i.e., 25 months compared with the 4-to 5-year-olds in the study by Saunders et aI., 1999) are capable of unreinforced conditional selection (URCS), (b) that URCSs are not restricted to visual-visual conditional discriminations but can also occur to auditory samples (on auditory-visual conditional discriminations), (c) that URCSs can occur on six-choice procedures, not just the two-and three-choice procedures of prior studies, (d) that URCSs can occur on standard MTS procedures in the absence of any experimental history of reinforcement, and (e) that patterns of URCS can be retained in the long-term, with subject HW maintaining his three arbitrarily assigned conditional relations across a 43-day gap in testing.
These findings rest upon regularities derived from a post-hoc analysis of the data. This may cause concern to some reviewers because post-hoc analyses can be prone to observer bias, that is, if one looks long enough one might be able to find patterns and regularities even in random data. This, however, was not the process we used to determine UCRS. Prior to data collection, we specified objective criteria for deciding whether conditional relations had formed between sample words and comparison pictures that were paired during the exposure phase. URCS was revealed by applying those same criteria to all sample-comparison combinations. Although our analysis was post hoc it was driven by objective criteria laid down in advance of the study.
Although 2 of the 2-year-olds in this study produced URCSs, the other 2 did not. This was not surprising given that much older normally developing children have also failed to produce URCSs. A 12-year-old tested by Williams et al. (1995) did not show URCSs on three-choice visual-visual matching tests, and a 7 -year-old in the same study only did so with respect to two of the three sample stimuli after extensive additional reinforced training of three-choice conditional discriminations, some of which involved the same samples and comparisons used in the URCS tests. Williams et al. speculated that further conditional discrimination training would have enabled these 2 children ultimately to produce URCSs to all three samples. The claim is supported by the data from studies by Saunders et al. (1988) and Saunders and Spradlin (1990) of retarded subjects who did not at the outset respond conditionally to abstract visual samples on arbitrary MTS trials but eventually came to do so without reinforcement after learning numerous such conditional discriminations via differential reinforcement. This indeed suggests that a reinforced history of conditional discrimination training is necessary for URCSs. The findings from the present study do not contradict this suggestion because although 2-year-olds proved capable of URCSs despite having no history of conditional discrimination training in the experiment itself, that history had presumably occurred prior to the experiment. The children had already learned many auditory-visual conditional discriminations in the natural course of acquiring listener (or 'verbal comprehension') repertoires in their native language. They could all respond conditionally to auditory name samples such as "ball," "cow," "cup," and "animal" by reliably selecting the corresponding objects or picture comparisons (as shown by their performances on the familiar name-picture pretests of the study and the verbal comprehension subtests of the Reynell language scale). The fact that in spite of this 2 of the children showed no URCSs suggests an important proviso to the reinforcement history account; perhaps URCSs are more likely to be shown (especially by such young children) in cases where the history has involved stimuli sufficiently similar to those employed in the tests. Did the 2-year-olds who showed URCSs have more prior experience than those who did not of conditional discriminations involving proper name samples? Would teaching a number of such conditional discriminations enhance the prospects of children subsequently making URCSs to these kinds of samples? Would those children who showed URCSs on our auditory-visual tests also have done so with tests comprising nonidentical visual samples and comparisons? As Green (1990) has observed, it is difficult to pinpoint in the natural environment of preschool children pure examples of such visual-visual conditional discriminations. With little or no preexperimental history of reinforced visual-visual non identity matching, one might expect 2-year-olds to be less likely to show URCSs to visual than auditory samples, unless, that is, testing is preceded by visual-visual pretraining to compensate in the experimental context for what was previously lacking in natural settings. Further research is necessary to determine whether or not URCSs are shown only when test stimuli are sufficiently congruent with those in existing conditional discriminations established inside or outside the experiment.
Although many questions remain to be resolved, the data from the present study sound a warning to researchers studying equivalence via single cases: Even with 2-year-olds, URCS is a potential source of falsepositives. The finding that URCS can occur to some but not all samples presented to such young children is especially relevant. Imagine using two-choice procedures to teach a child AB and BC relations and then test BA and CB (symmetry), AC (transitivity), and CA (equivalence). If the child passes AC only and produces chance levels of accuracy on the remaining test problems, the typical interpretation would be that the trained relations were transitive but not symmetrical. The experimenter might be aware of the phenomenon of URCS but dismiss it as an alternative source of accurate responding on the basis that consistent conditional selections were not made to the Band C samples in symmetry and equivalence tests. The underlying assumption is that if URCS occurs at all with a given child then it would occur on all trial types presented. This assumption is incorrect, as the present data show; it seems URCS itself can be under some kind of conditional control, occurring to some trial types but not others. Even if there is no sign of URCS on most test problems of a series it can still underlie accurate performance on the remainder. Moreover, increasing the number of choices on a MTS task does not necessarily eliminate the problem. If one, say, teaches AB via an n-choice task (establishing A1-B1, A2-B2, etc., up to An-Bn) and then finds, in symmetry tests, that when B1 is the sample only A 1 is selected, and when the sample is not B 1 no comparison is chosen consistently, one might be tempted to conclude that symmetry has been demonstrated for one of the n-trained relations. Indeed, faced with similar patterns of data some researchers (e.g., Yamamoto & Asano, 1995) have succumbed to that temptation. The conclusion may be false; despite n equaling 6 in the present study, some subjects still produced URCSs to some of the samples, so the potential for URCS-based falsepositives remains in situations like those illustrated above.
The present findings may also interest child language researchers working outside behavior analysis. URCS is a potential, and hitherto unrecognized, source of bias in their tests of young children's comprehension of novel words that have been presented in an ostensive context (see Introduction). In this research tradition, the criterion for a positive test outcome is a group mean accuracy that is far enough above chance levels to reach statistical significance. In practice, statistical significance is often achieved with a mean accuracy of 65% to 75% in a two-choice MTS test. With an average score in this range, the chances are that not all children reliably selected the correct comparison given the novel target-word sample. Of those who did, how many did so merely via URCS rather than as a function of ostensive exposure? It might be argued that such a question loses relevance in the context of group methodology; with a large enough sample of subjects, the effects of URCS on a two-choice test should algebraically average to zero given that, by chance, approximately half the subjects who make URCSs should select the comparison designated correct (i.e., produce a high accuracy on the test), and half should select the 'incorrect' comparison (i.e., produce a low accuracy). Group mean scores seem even less likely to be inflated when tests involve more than two choices (i.e., more than one incorrect comparison) and hence the chance of making a correct choice via URCS appears lower than making an incorrect one. However, there is good reason to believe that children making URCSs on these tests would, irrespective of the number of incorrect comparisons available, predominantly select the correct (or target) comparison; typically it is the only one named by the experimenter during ostensive exposures. When asked to make a choice conditional upon a novel name sample, it would hardly be surprising if the child selects the only comparison to have previously been given a novel name. In order to do this, the child does not have to note the specific characteristics of the word used during ostensive exposures, only that it is novel (i.e., discriminate the word as novel yet be unable to discriminate that word from other novel words). It then follows that any novel name sample presented in test trials should induce URCS of the target comparison item. Unfortunately, of the studies cited in the introduction, only Oviatt's have incorporated such ·control trials (Oviatt, 1980 (Oviatt, , 1982 , and these studies have other methodological shortcomings (see Woodward et ai., 1994 , for a critique). It is therefore entirely possible that URCS is inflating the group mean scores of many studies of children's ostensive learning. By how much remains to be determined.
In future, researchers might consider attempting to detect URCS at the outset by testing their subjects on the critical arbitrary matching trials before the experimental intervention in question is introduced (whether that be baseline training in an equivalence study or ostensive exposures in a child language study). Pretesting was an integral part of the very first equivalence studies (Sidman, 1971; Sidman & Cresson, 1973; Sidman , Cresson, & Willson-Morris, 1974) but it is rarely, if ever, done nowadays, perhaps because greater emphasis has been given to its disadvantages (see, for example, Sidman, 1987) . Typically, procedures other than pretesting are used to detect, or control for, the threat of URCS in equivalence studies, but these too have their disadvantages. One tactic is to assess equivalence across more than the minimum of three stimulus sets so that the variety of test relations increases and the likelihood of the subject passing them all via URCS diminishes. However, each additional stimulus set employed increases by one the number of sets of baseline relations that have to be trained before, and maintained during, equivalence tests. This increase in demand may put criterion performance on baseline trials beyond the reach of very young or developmentally delayed children, thus preventing them from even getting to the point of testing. Another tactic is to show that conditional relations on equivalence tests reverse when the reinforcement contingencies controlling the baseline relations are reversed (see, for example, Spradlin, Cotter, & Baxley, 1973) . Baseline reversals, however, do not always produce reversals on equivalence probes (Pilgrim & Galizio, 1990 ) and when they do not do so it does not necessarily follow that the original emergent performances were URCSs rather than genuine equivalence. The advantage of pretests is that they enable positive identification of U RCS before equivalence tests are conducted. Conversely, if subjects fail pretests, we can be surer that they could not already do via URCS what our experimental interventions were supposed to make possible.
